Human Development and People's Participation in Governance

Throughout the world, there is a growing demand and trend for people's participation as a dimension of human development. This trend reaffirms the idea of *democracy as participatory politics*. From a modern standpoint, people's participation in the processes of governance is a crucial dimension of human development. In reality, however, its use and practice in the broader sense of democracy has always been contested.

Many times in the latter part of this century, there have been serious challenges to the idea that people should seek as much as possible to participate politically in society. The pervasiveness of complex bureaucracies in the industrialized countries has cast doubt whether democratic participatory politics could really be achieved. Moreover, many pre- and post-war political regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, have become unstable in spite (or even because) of high levels of mass participation. This cast further doubts on the viability of participatory politics, since either democracy itself caused instability or people's participation could be manipulated to prop up authoritarianism. Studies in different countries in the latter half of this century also showed widespread non-democratic or authoritarian attitudes, particularly among the poor. More recently, the experience of the newly industrializing countries, many of which are not democratic, lent credence and attractiveness to the notion that economic success comes at the price of non-democracy.

All these developments provide the basis for theories that merely regard democracy as a "political method...an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions" in which popular participation has no "special or central role" (Pateman 1970:1-3). At the very least, these theories deny that democracy and people's participation go hand in hand. More cynically, they question whether democracy in practice involves real participation, or whether participation really requires institutions of democracy, as commonly understood.

At present, democratization and people's participation are once again "becoming the central issue of our time" (UNDP 1993:1). This phenomenon has been described as a "third wave of democratization," marked by the fact that "between 1974 and 1990, more than thirty countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government" (Huntington 1992:579). In these historic transitions, people's participation proved a decisive force.

Participation is a "process of enlarging people's choices" (UNDP 1990:10). It means people being able to influence and control decision-making processes and relationships of power (UNDP 1993:21). The basic premise is that a participatory environment develops democratic qualities and engenders feelings of political efficacy by addressing "the interrelationship between individuals and the authority structures of institutions within which they interact" (Pateman 1970:103). In its strongest sense, therefore, people's participation is a process that empowers the people with the "freedom to choose and change governance at every level..."

(UNDP 1993:21), including such institutions as the family, the workplace, the market and the school system which in themselves establish particular patterns of authority and power structures.

People's participation has direct and unequivocal relationship to human development. It is a component of human development, together with longevity, knowledge, and the widening material choices attributed to rising income. In this sense, democracy as participatory politics, is not merely a method — preferred over many — of arriving at decisions, but an end unequivocably desirable in itself.

The sophisticated objection to this is that people's participation does not always require democracy. Matters taken up in electoral struggles, especially at the national level, have little to do with people's welfare. After all, self-help projects that NGOs and POs undertake require little by way of national inputs. This kind of argument is inadequate for at least two reasons:

First, this would happen only if national politics were at least benevolent to local initiatives. But the structural defects cited earlier precludes this benevolence. The desire for a benevolent authoritarianism suffers from the authoritarian dilemma: there is still no foolproof way of screening would-be dictators except through a democratic process.

Second, the growing interdependence of markets prevent local initiatives from remaining affected by national affairs and policies.

This chapter and the next focus on people's participation as represented by the interaction between the people and their organizations, on the one hand, and formal governmental structures of power and decision-making, on the other. Since authoritative social and political decisions are normally made at the structures of power, people's participation in these structures is strategically important in defining the priorities of human development in society.

Participatory politics in today's democratic systems occurs through elections. But the procedure of elections may either help or hinder real people's participation. In one scenario, clear-cut rules of electoral representation may merely ensure the regular selection of competing elites with little political participation by the people beyond the act of voting. In another context, the same rules for electoral representation, pushed to the limits

through radical electoral reforms, could enhance the representation of traditionally marginalized sectors of society. In small electoral districts, for example, a system of proportional representation with clear limits to campaign expenditures may significantly improve the chances of popular but poor parties. To some extent, it is even possible to experiment with *direct* forms of democratic participation (i.e., dispensing with the need for representatives), although this may be limited by the complexity of running present-day societies.

The Philippine Experience

Two concrete mechanisms of people's participation in governance are examined: the electoral process and the decentralization process. The contribution of key social agents in these processes is evaluated. This chapter and the next focus on these mechanisms and social agents for their historical importance, contemporary relevance, and proximate potential in enhancing the entire process of people's participation in the Philippine context. Indicators by which to evaluate the effectiveness of these mechanisms and social agents are provided.

In the Philippines, the terrain of people's participation in governance has been defined and constrained by at least three major structural realities which are partly a legacy of the colonial era, and partly a result of elite policies and decisions. *First*, a high level of inequality of control over wealth persists as a basic feature of economic activity, as seen in the unequal distribution of land and of income. Thus, the potential for conscious, effective and meaningful participation in governance is severely constrained by economic difficulties among a significant sector of the people.

Second, the gross inequalities in the control of productive resources, are reflected in the persistence of oligarchic politics. Dominant political clans and their allies continue to control elective positions of power in both national and local levels of government. In the first post-Marcos legislature elected in 1987, for example, 83 percent of the members of the House of Representatives belonged to elite families. Of all elected officials in the lower house, 67 percent belonged to established political clans (Gutierrez et al. 1992:162). The disparities in economic power that allow established clans to dominate also explain, to a large extent,

why political parties espousing well-defined alternative programs of government have failed to emerge.

Finally, a centralized but ineffective system of governance has further constrained people's participation. This is especially true at the local level, where the popular participation is most proximate and its impact most promising. Agencies of central government wield large powers, but they are also vulnerable to influence by powerful groups and political clans with vested interests in particularistic projects.

Because these structural constraints to popular participation exist, a decisive arena of people's participation in governance should be considered, namely, the electoral process. For all its flaws, the electoral process of selecting government officials has endured as the major terrain of people's participation in governance in the Philippines. In a complex society, there is no easy, feasible alternative to an electoral representational system of selecting public officials. Therefore, the possibilities and limits for participatory politics through this political method and practice must be systematically examined. Given the realities in the Philippines, any agenda for participatory politics must include radical reforms in the electoral process to advance and not impede people's participation.

Environment for People's Participation: Forces and Processes

Despite structural hindrances to popular participation in the Philippines, there are strong social forces in its favor. Socio-political movements, whose roots of protest and struggle reach back to the colonial and post-colonial history of the country, have spawned a vibrant community of people's organizations and non-government organizations. The political struggles against the Marcos dictatorship and the government's dismal record of governance and delivery of basic services catalyzed the emergence of these organizations.

POs and development NGOs today not only provide assistance, education and training to the marginalized sectors; more importantly, they help organize and empower the poor and powerless, advocate alternative policies, and explore new strategies for sharing and contesting power at various levels of governance. A promising development has been the emergence of a dynamic women's movement (Appendix 5.1). As more women assume policymaking positions in formal structures of governance, the effect of the women's movement on the comprehensive process of people's participation in all areas and levels of decisionmaking could be most strategically important.

Another arena for enhancing people's participation in local governing bodies is *decentralization* as mandated by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). The Code devolves powers and functions of governance long monopolized by the central government. It provides for the representation of women, POs and NGOs, and other sectors in local government councils and in special local boards and councils. But while decentralization offers new opportunities for people's participation, it also creates new problems, such as the need to develop their requisite technical and financial competence to deal with the devolved responsibilities. Ultimately, however, the Code provides a signal opportunity to challenge and redress oligarchic relations of power at the local levels. If this is done, local governments can become the building blocks of a truly democratic and participatory society.

As further evidence of the significance of these social forces and processes for participatory politics, public opinion surveys show that Filipinos have "learned to value democratic institutions as a requirement for social development" (Arroyo 1990:1). For instance, in a public opinion survey conducted in 1985, 61 percent said the President should not have the power to legislate by decree, and 65 percent said the President must not have the power of preventive detention (Arroyo 1990:1). A 1988 public opinion survey by the Social Weather Station showed that 42 percent of a nationwide sample agreed with the statement that *ordinary citizens have strong organizations, thus, they can effectively participate in governing the country.* Only 22 percent disagreed with the statement (Arroyo 1990:2).

Elections

People's participation is effective only if it can influence governance. Ideally, the test should be found in whether policies and laws formulated by the government actually reflect the interests of the people and their

organizations. That is less than easy, however, since it would lead to discussions regarding what the people's *real* interests are (which, of course, each would want to define according to his or her own framework). Rather than pre-judge the outcomes, the next best thing to do is to evaluate how genuine is the *process* by which people participate in governance.

To ensure people's participation, the following formal mechanisms are envisioned by constitutional provisions, laws, policies and actions:

    (a) Peaceful and orderly voter registration, elections, plebiscites and referendums;

    (b) A system of people's initiative and recall;

    (c) Sectoral and PO representation in lawmaking, program-monitoring, and implementing bodies at national and local levels; and

    (d) Sectoral representation in congressional and other public hearings.

In the past, the traditional view of participation in a representative democracy[1] considered the electoral process provided for in law to be a sufficient and overriding form of people's participation. Regular trips to the ballot box every six and three years would be the epitome of a citizen's main role. For this reason, many conservatives would view skeptically and consider disruptive most people's initiatives (e.g., rallies, marches, general strikes, and others) that are not related to electoral campaigns but which attempt to intervene directly or make a forceful statement in the process of resolving public issues.

In theory and under ideal circumstances, periodic elections might suffice to convey basic programs that promote the people's interest. In practice, however, this view is too complacent for a fundamental reason: the existing inequity of social and economic power simply works against the effectiveness of elections. How genuine is the electorate's will if voters live under threat of economic or even physical extinction, if they have no access to media and to information on policymaking processes and government performance, if they are unaware of voters' rights and electoral procedures? Where the many depend economically on the few, are less educated, less articulate, and less informed —

especially where the fundamental interests of the elite diverge from those of the majority — the integrity of the electoral process itself will always be threatened, and the genuineness of the mandate and priorities expressed by elected representatives will always tend to be compromised. For this reason, other channels besides periodic elections must be resorted to in re-asserting people's demands. The recognition of this idea underlays the inclusion of people's initiatives and the system of recall in the 1987 Constitution.

NGOs and POs have been closely associated with what is now known as *extra-parliamentary* means of political intervention. Partly owing to a degree of success of these extra-parliamentary means, there is a tendency to think of these as *substitutes* for elections and parliamentary procedures. It must be recognized, however, that extra-parliamentary means are relevant only because the mainstream system of delivering political goods is failing to work as it should. Extra-parliamentary intervention must be regarded as complementing the admittedly imperfect operation of the electoral and parliamentary process. People's increasing resort to extra-parliamentary intervention is both a sign of increasing awareness of their rights and of the mainstream system's failure to accommodate them.

Essentially, extra-parliamentary efforts — short of revolution[2] — represent the demands to improve and strengthen the existing mainstream system of governance. In strategies to alleviate poverty, the ultimate aim is not to carve out a separate sector for the poor, but to include hitherto marginalized sectors in the mainstream of economic life. Similarly, the final goal of people's participation in governance is not best served by resorting only to the most "special" means of intervention, no matter how "militant" these may be, but *also* by laying claim to the mainstream and ordinary electoral and parliamentary processes as well. For just this reason, it is important to demand and ensure the success and integrity of the electoral process.

As in other developing countries with democratic political systems, the success of the electoral process depends on high voter' registration, a high voter' turnout, and low incidence of fraud and violence. Yet,

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1 Of course, in systems of *direct* democracy, people themselves would take a direct role in planning, deliberating, and implementing their affairs.

2 This has not prevented revolutionary movements from espousing reforms under the present system as tactical maneuvers.

another factor that must be examined is who get elected and how, and the extent to which average citizens can influence elective officials in the performance of their official duties.

Where wealth and patronage largely determine electoral victory, people's participation will be severely hampered. Most election winners find themselves more accountable to their financial backers and power-brokers than to their voting constituents. They are pressured to represent big business and landlord interests rather than the interest of the powerless majority. Paradoxically, the exercise of suffrage is then alienated from the principle of popular consent and representation upon which it is founded.

What makes an electoral system effective? The holding of elections by itself does not guarantee popular consent and representation. A checkered political experience has produced mixed perceptions among the people about the value of elections. The flawed electoral process in the country has yielded less than meaningful changes. However, the turnout of voters has always been high, and people welcome electoral campaigns, indicating that elections are taken seriously. But stringent requirements must exist to safeguard the democratic value of political equality. In particular, the integrity of the electoral system must be guaranteed through:

    (a) protection of the right to vote;

    (b) protection of the right to run for public office; and

    (c) enforcement of election results.

The right to vote

Equal suffrage requires that people have reasonable access to the place of voting, that they be free to cast their votes as they wish, and that each vote be given exactly the same weight when counted. But the most basic requirement is that the individual must be allowed to vote in the first place, and that no obstacle should prevent him or her from voting (Sargent 1987: 63).

Historically, this last requirement has not always been fulfilled. When the electoral system was introduced in the Philippines by the U.S. government in 1901, it discriminated according to gender, literacy, and property. A voter was required, among other things, to be a male, at least 23 years of age, to speak, read and write in Spanish or English, own real property worth at least P500, or have held a local government position prior to the U.S. occupation (Tancangco 1987: 10).

The present Constitution promulgated in 1987 grants suffrage to "... all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election" (Art. V, Sec. 1). No literacy, property or other substantive requirement is imposed. The Constitution also mandates that Congress provide systems to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, to permit absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad, and to allow the disabled and the illiterate to vote without the assistance of other persons (Sec. 2).

The last major national and local elections held in May 1992 were generally free, fair, peaceful and orderly — a record that significantly improved the credibility of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the electoral system itself. Synchronized polls were conducted in 170,354 precincts nationwide, where 75.44 percent or over 24 million of some 32 million registered voters turned out for the polls. The Comelec regulated the campaigns of 87,770 national and local candidates — the largest number of aspirants ever — for 17,282 positions. The Commission effectively supervised the work of over 800,000 deputies from various government agencies and administered around 550,000 volunteers of its citizen's arms. The counting was relatively slow but largely uncontested. A month after the elections, Congress proclaimed the duly-elected President and Vice-President of the Republic.

The Commission disposed of 1,357 cases arising from the 1992 elections; it organized special legal task forces which resolved 1,198 cases arising from the 1987, 1988 and 1989 elections. The total number of cases resolved for the periods covered was 2,565 (Comelec 1993: 3).

The 1992 synchronized elections showed the lowest statistics in recent election history (Figure 21) in terms of officially recorded election-related violent incidents and casualties. If this continues, this should be an encouraging trend. In the past, intimidation and the threat of political violence have been the most serious obstacles to free participation in the elections.

Figure 21
ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE

Source: Commission on Elections

In assessing the 1992 elections, the Comelec report commended its principal deputies: the public school teachers, the Philippine National Police, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines as being "outstanding in the performance of their duties, despite instances of partisanship and of election offenses or negligence on the part of some of them" (Comelec 1993:60). The increasing role of volunteer organizations, however, was also significant. This refers principally to the Media-Citizen's Quick Count, the Parish Pastoral Councils for Responsible Voting, National Social Action for Justice and Peace (Nassa) of the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines, and the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel).

Voter turnout is typically cited for measuring people's participation in elections, and this has been fairly high, ranging from a low of 67.5 percent for the barangay elections in 1989 to 89.1 percent for the national elections in 1984. In the synchronized elections of 1992, voter turnout was at least 85 percent. Without further qualification, however, the significance of voter turnout is ambiguous. For example, it is paradoxical that the highest voter turnout was recorded under the Marcos dictatorship, while the lowest was during the Aquino administration when democratic processes had

been fully restored. Voter turnout is now also generally higher for national rather than for local elections.[3] Could it be that more resources are mobilized and released during national elections? Or are campaign plans, strategies, and tactics more centrally managed and directed? Or is the entertainment value simply higher during national elections?

All these questions merely suggest, as will be argued later, that the *quality* of people's participation must be addressed, and that the significance of electoral processes itself cannot be divorced from the social fabric into which they are woven.

Running for office

Another aspect of political equality that a democratic state must guarantee is the opportunity of each citizen to run for public office. Anyone who may vote must also have the right to be elected to public office.

In practice, the ability to run in and win an election has always hinged on political influence. The latter is determined by personal endowments, political resources, the skill or efficiency with which these politi-

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[3]This is the reverse of the pre-martial law period, when local election turnout was higher.

cal resources are used, and the extent to which they are used for political purposes (Dahl 1984: 31). Rules must be formulated to enhance the citizens' options for selecting their leaders and their opportunities for a fair chance of winning, should they run for public office. The system should also strengthen political parties as protagonists in electoral contests.

Since the American occupation, those elected have usually been from the propertied elite (Salamança 1984:56). Until now, elections are largely a contest among the rich and those who represent them. Candidates must typically spend in a major way on propaganda materials, media plugs, rallies, meetings, fees, transportation, and food for supporters, poll watchers and ward leaders.

After the elections, a candidate needs logistical provisions to safeguard the accurate recording of votes in his or her favor, to carry out the unhampered transfer of tallies to the city/town hall, to ensure the correct issuance of certificates of canvass by the board of canvassers, and to see to the smooth transmission of these certificates to the Comelec. In these various steps, the retention, addition or deletion of terminal zeros in tabulation sheets can be crucial to one's political fate.

The cost of a fair chance at winning is P10 million for a mayoralty candidate in a big city; P20 million for a gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate, or congressional candidate; P50-60 million for a senatorial candidate; and at least P300 million for a presidential candidate. These still do not include the contribution some political parties require from their official candidates as well as the large sums needed to file or defend cases of electoral protest. In the face of these costs, it is next to impossible for the average citizen to run with a fighting chance in an electoral contest. In other contexts, the existence of strong platform-based parties with clear constituencies allows the costs for less affluent and less well-known candidates to be reduced. But this is not possible in the local context, owing to the absence of well-established parties and the predominance of personalities instead.

Besides favoring the wealthy or well-to-do, another adverse consequence of the high cost of running for election is the predisposition to recoup these expenses subsequently. Since the salaries for elective positions are dwarfed by the expenses needed to get elected, there is pressure to secure other sources of compensation, including graft.

The Omnibus Election Code provides for some significant reforms to correct the abuses of past elections. These include limits to campaign expenditures and guidelines for media exposure. Candidates have typically found ways to get around these, however. To strengthen the party system and ensure the representation of marginalized sectors, the 1986 Constitutional Commission also introduced the concept of sectoral representation and the party-list system in the Constitution. However, lawmakers have not enacted laws to institutionalize them. Sectoral representatives are still appointed by the President. Neither has the full number of sectoral representatives been filled for fear that this might upset the existing balance of forces.

Enforcing election results

The state finally must guarantee that those who actually win elections assume office. This requirement seems almost obvious, yet there have been instances when it has not been observed. Two episodes are especially notable. In 1946, six candidates of the Democratic Alliance led by Luis Taruc were elected to the House of Representatives but were prevented from taking office after being labeled Communists. The reason was to ensure the passage of a constitutional amendment granting parity rights to Americans (Agoncillo and Alfonso 1971:507).

In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos dealt the fatal blow to the electoral system by imposing martial law to perpetuate himself in power. His second and last term should have ended in 1973, but his proclamation of a self-serving constitution enabled him to extend his rule until he was overthrown in February 1986. Marcos's government party manipulated and corrupted elections, further reinforcing negative attitudes toward the electoral system (de Guzman and Tancangco 1986) and inciting intense debates among opposition groups and POs on whether they should participate in elections at all. International pressure forced Marcos to call a "snap" election in February 1986, in which he ran against Corazon Aquino. The widely-known manipulation of election results during that period became an immediate cause for the people to recourse to massive extra-parliamentary resistance and to support an otherwise failed military coup.

The fraud and cheating committed in the most recent elections certainly cannot be compared to the scale and system of fraud and cheating that prevailed under the dictatorship. Nonetheless, substantial deficiencies continue in the matter of enforcing election results, such as anomalies, lengthy voting counts, and delays in proclamation of winning candidates owing to legal disputes. All these lead to a dilution, if not to outright denial or misrepresentation, of the people's will.

Why is suffrage not translated
into genuine participation in governance?
Using the three indicators to evaluate electoral mechanisms, namely: (a) protection of the right to vote, (b) protection of the right to run for public office, and (c) enforcement of election results, it may be concluded that the state has often fallen short of its democratic obligations. The government has succeeded in instituting electoral reforms and has gone some distance in making electoral processses freer and more genuine since the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1986. However, it should still be asked whether the current electoral processes give ordinary citizens a genuinely free choice and greater access to running for public office. In its report, even the Comelec concedes that "much more needs to be done to truly democratize the election process and to make it less oriented to money and celebrities" (Comelec 1993:60).

The same three guarantees mentioned can be used to gauge the security and effectiveness of the electoral mechanisms in various communities. They can be used to evaluate election-related programs and activities of POs by determining the extent to which these organizations have responded to the shortcomings of the state in protecting the integrity of the electoral process.

It cannot be denied that formal guarantees in the electoral processes exist — indeed more so than in other countries — yet a more pro-people agenda has failed to evolve. The fact is that large structural obstacles that make a genuine exercise of suffrage difficult continue to exist. A discussion of these obstacles follow:

■ A first obstacle is the dominance of the elite in setting the political agenda. A study by the Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the Institute for Popular Democracy (1992), which traced the careers and economic backgrounds of members of Congress, clearly showed that the House of Representatives was dominated by the elite. The study found, for example, that among members of Congress, 38 were entrepreneurs prior to their present positions, 25 were top officials of big business corporations, 94 directly owned agricultural and pasture lands, 36 owned farmlands or pasturelands worth more than P1 million, 53 owned or managed real estate agencies, at least 42 controlled manufacturing enterprises and factories, 28 had investments in holding, management and investment companies, and at least 137 were landowners and agricultural entrepreneurs (Gutierrez et al. 1992). All 24 senators had assets in excess of P1 million.

The elitist nature of Congress plays a big role in setting a largely conservative agenda. Among others, it means that agrarian and asset reform "will ... have no chance of ever being seriously considered by the present Congress." For example, 30 representatives from Mindanao submitted a bill exempting that region from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law for the next quarter century. A veritable "power base for elite agenda," the House of Representatives can steer the direction and implementation of government programs (Gutierrez et al. 1992).

■ Beyond formal requirements and external circumstances, the elusive but fundamental issue in voting is the authenticity of the preferences and will expressed by voters in elections. The most obvious manifestation of this is vote-buying and -selling which, except for the most blatant examples of direct payment, are both difficult to define and monitor. Indeed "softer" forms such as voting for the local boss in exchange for vaguely defined personal favors would not even be illegal, and may be construed as part of the right to choose. Still, the basic question is whether there can be genuine democratic choice in a hierarchical society characterized by dependence and extreme inequality in wealth and power. The radical critique of the elections is really a question of whether real-life material relations of dominance and dependence can actually be *suspended* in the abstract during the brief period of elections, leading to results that reflect the long-run interests of the people.

The deeper issue in the right to vote, therefore, is whether a choice genuinely exists for the electorate.

This is at times difficult to maintain, considering the predominance of patronage and the weakness of political parties. Philippine politics is rooted in a patronage system similar to the patron-client relationship between landlord and tenants. The politician plays the role of father-landlord while his constituents and followers are the children-tenants. An economy characterized by personal dependence, combined with a government that identifies leadership solely with personality, has serious consequences for democracy. Party loyalties become purely calculating and pragmatic. Although parties may claim their platforms to be based on issues and specific programs of action (a few even purport to have ideological foundations), party affiliation is largely determined by personal gains and opportunities.

■ Underpinning the entire process is the chronic scarcity of public resources, on the one hand, and the vast discretionary power given to those who do come into power, on the other. For example, congressmen and local officials who belong to the losing side may find that their areas typically get last priority in the release of their countrywide development funds or in the distribution and hierarchy of public works projects. Scarcity plus discretion equals patronage.

With few exceptions, therefore, politicians cynically shift political parties based on the strengths and likely success of leaders. The matter is founded not simply on poor ethics, but also on realpolitik. A party's goals, strategies, and the consolidation of its membership will be determined largely by personalities. Consequently, "turncoatism" is a prominent feature of Philippine politics, with loyalty shifts justified by "the dictates of patriotism" or "the requirements of the constituents." As paternalistic provider, the politician, like the landlord, constantly invokes his obligation to serve the needs of his supporters by whatever means. The ability to provide favors to enough persons or narrow constituencies is the source of legitimacy and charisma, and the yardstick of effectiveness and stature. Principles and adherence to party platforms take the back seat.

Under these circumstances, the *economic* content of the political relationship between poorer constituents and politicians is bound to be trivialized to the level of dispensing occasional trivial favors, in exchange for the assurance of re-election. Voters will seek (and obtain)

nothing more from politicians than attention to their narrowest agendas, quite oblivous of the methods and morals that underpin these relationship. Hence, for example, even despoilers, grafters, and coup artists may be elected simply because they are likelier to win,[4] or have more influence with the individuals in power. Voters come to regard election campaigns as an opportunity to "collect" minimal favors from politicians; on the extreme, the return may be nothing more than entertainment value. In much the same way that people are willing to buy tickets to see a movie, they are willing to participate in elections to be entertained.

■ A final factor preventing a more genuine exercise of suffrage by the citizens is the simple lack of information and meaningful education. Previous chapters have noted the importance of literacy and education as components of human development and as means to higher income (i.e., as human capital). But education and information in all their forms — including media, conscientization, politization, mass work, and others — are also crucial in the development of participation in governance. Essentially, education and information — if effective — promote a sense of nationhood and permit people to see possibilities for change beyond short-term and individual or sectoral interests. For example, rather than be content with quarrelling over crumbs from a kingpin's countrywide development fund to finance the occasional road repair or school house, constituents may see that there may be a more effective means of allocating infrastructure expenditures through the mustering of these funds for larger projects rather than the dissipating of such over wide areas to maximize billboard exposure. Rather than rest content with local officials assurance of tolerated squatting, the urban poor may demand integrated provision of alternative housing sites and transport. In a word, education and information may undermine the cycle of parochial politics which reduces democracy to a squabble among local and sectoral minorities with narrow agendas, manipulated by elites with even more selfish motives.

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[4]As witnessed in this common exchange: *"Sino 'ng iboboto mo?"* — *"Yung mananalo, siyempre."* ("Who will you vote for?" — "The winner, of course.")

Participation by POs and NGOs

In its current state, the electoral system can only fail to inspire participation by the POs and NGOs. Fraud and violence, the high cost of campaigns, the absence of a credible party system, the focus on personalities instead of issues, and the dominance of political dynasties are all factors that make it difficult for POs and NGOs to enter the mainstream arena. The recent limited participation of the POs and NGOs in the elections of 1992 certainly illustrates the complexities and hardships involved. (See also Chapter 6).

Yet, the need to break out of the cycle is obvious. Some would contend that circumstances are inherently incapable of changing without first altering — possibly in a violent manner — the very economic relations of dependence in which people find themselves bound and which distort the quality of their political aspects of human development, especially education and political information and greater economic independence, could develop sufficiently to enable people to make more genuine use of the formal opportunities open under electoral participation.

Apart from very real structural obstacles, however, part of the reason why POs and NGOs have not made a significant impact on the elections is that they have set up obstacles of their own making. The most basic of these have to do with differences in line and political assessments that have prevented them from uniting on a common platform and approach to elections. In the synchronized elections of 1992, for example, perennial debates and mutual distrust divided NGOs and POs into the "national democrats" (who subscribed to a line along radical Marxist lines) and the "social democrats" (who advocated Christian democratic socialism). Although the two groups agreed on various issues, they failed to agree on particular candidates to support. Many did not believe in election for ideological reasons; still others opted not to support individual candidates, and instead decided to produce and distribute materials to mobilize votes based on issues, e.g., the youth vote, the debt vote, the women's vote, the green vote, or the human rights vote. A faceless, highly intellectual approach to the campaign failed to excite the masses of voters grown accustomed to the gimmicks of the traditional politicians and candidates from the entertainment world. The POs and NGOs not only failed to help cause-oriented candidates win, they also abdicated their pre-election position of influence. The result was that few lawmakers became beholden to POs or regarded them as an important constituency.

This same problem has recently cropped up with the split among Left organizations into the "reaffirm" versus the "reject" lines (with a vast middle ground held by what is known as the "rejoice" group).[5] In the Philippines today, the impending split along ideological lines is one of the major threats to the strength and effectivity of POs and NGOs in the near term.

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[5]These distinctions have to do with the question of whether or not activists continue to "reaffirm" the orthodox analysis and leadership of the Communist Party or whether they "reject" this. Those who have not been directly involved in this, on the other hand, are said to "rejoice" over this turn of events.

Appendix 5.1
WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE

Filipino women project a strong political presence outside the Philippines. Corazon Aquino, for example, was one of the few women heads of state well-known to the world. Foreigners marvel at the fact that they often have to deal with women managers and leaders when they come to the country. For instance, the head of the Civil Service Commission, the Secretary of Labor, and the head of the National Unification Commission are women. The question, therefore, is not whether women participate in governance in the Philippines, but how many women participate, how effectively they do so, and in which mechanisms they participate.

For women in the Philippines, participation in governance is more covert than overt, indirectly rather than directly political. They participate in governance through the bureaucracy where they predominate unlike their sisters in other countries whose participation is much smaller. In overtly political activities, women's participation takes place largely through voting. Increasingly, however, women have been active in NGOs and POs which have become overtly political through advocacy of causes, lobbying, and other activities.

A study for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) observed that, "proportionately, it is more than ten times easier for women to enter occupations in the Philippines than in Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore, India and Malaysia — more or less in that order" (Ward 1963). An important reason for this is the high *literacy rate* among Filipino women, which has consistently been almost at par with the men. Census figures for 1990 show the literacy rate for males being 93.70 percent, and for females being 93.37 percent, or a difference of less than one-third of 1 percent. For 1980, 1970, and 1960, the figures are comparable. This fact must be counted as one of the successes of the public education system.

Male educational attainment is generally still higher than that of females because some women marry young and drop out, while others stay at home to help with the chores. On the other hand, for those who manage to attend school, the completion rate of college education among women is higher than among men. The presence of more females in the university has been attributed by

the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women to "the early participation of men in the labor force." Conversely, this also suggests that less employment opportunities are available to women without college degrees.

Aside from preparing them directly for political participation, education also prepares women for participation in the labor force. Female participation in the labor force is less than that of males, but the trend has been rising. Women dominate the community, social and personal services sectors, and they constitute almost half of those employed in the manufacturing sector. They are less represented in agriculture, construction, and transportation. The potential implications of a rising female labor force participation in politics can be far-reaching. If women are gradually able to participate in the economic mainstream and contribute to money incomes in the family, their role in the family and in society at large is certain to be enhanced, and, so correspondingly, so will their political role.

On the whole, the gap between males and females in literacy and educational attainment is small and narrowing, but a gap remains nonetheless. In addition, as already noted in Chapter 3, there are regions where the female-male discrepancies are larger than in others. As a result, it may be expected that the extent of participation in political life would be less in those areas. Barriers such as those in education may thus impede the advancement of women in some aspects of life.

When one views the political process as composed of policy formulation, policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation, one can delineate women's participation in each stage.

One crucial aspect of political participation is *the law*. The Constitution provides for equal participation of men and women in society. This has been reinforced by recent legislations like the Local Government Code which provides for the selection of women sectoral representatives, the Women in Development Act (RA 7192) which provides for equal participation of women in economic activities, the revised Labor Code which removed discriminatory provisions against women workers, and the prohibition of advertising for mail

order brides. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women spearheaded the creation of Women in Development Focal Points in every agency of the government. A Philipine Development Plan for Women was also launched in 1989.

Despite such efforts, there are still so many areas to legislate for women. Nonetheless, the existing laws affecting women already indicate the extent of their participation in society. As shown above, headway has been made in recent years for laws providing women equal opportunities with men.

Policy formulation

The stage of policy formulation includes the recruitment of persons into the political institutions of government. How do women participate in the electoral process? An indicator that may be used is *frequency in voter participation*. COMELEC statistics have shown that, through all the election years beginning 1946, more registered female voters have trooped to the polls than registered male voters (Appendix Table 5.1.1 and Appendix Figure 5.1.1). The average voter turn-out among women is 79.31 percent while for men, it is only 78.57 percent. The difference is slight (0.74 percent) but it is significant, nonetheless, if only for the simple fact that

the rate for women is comparable at all with, or even higher than, that of men. In the 1992 elections, the difference in participation rates was historically the largest, about five percentage points difference, or a ratio of 1.067. This is a phenomenon that still needs to be explained.

Besides voting, running for and winning public office is another aspect of the electoral process. Here, there is a discrepancy between the apparently large involvement of women in elections and the small number of women running for or winning political office. Until 1987, only an average of 5.78 percent of national legislators were women (Tancangco 1990). In the 1992 national elections, the proportion of elected women legislators rose to 9.5 percent in the House of Representatives and 16.7 percent in the Senate (Aguilar in Tapales 1992a).

The proportions are higher in the local levels than in the national legislature. Based on statistics of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma cited the proportions of women elected as local government chief executive and deputies in 1992: 9.2 percent for provincial governors, 6.6 percent for provincial vice-governors, 11.0 percent for provincial sanggunians, 3.3 percent of city mayors, 10

Apendix Figure 5.1.1
FEMALE-MALE RATIO OF VOTER TURNOUT RATES

Source: Commission on Elections

percent for city vice-mayors, 8 percent for municipal mayors, and 8.6 percent for municipal vice-mayors (Appendix Table 5.1.2). As can be seen from these figures, there is a higher percentage of women elected to legislative than to executive positions. Therefore, one might use the *proportion of women in electoral politics* as another indicator, knowing how Filipino women have traditionally scored low in this.

Appendix Table 5.1.1
WOMEN ELECTED TO THE LEGISLATURE (1946-1992)

Election	Position	Women elected	Positions to fill	Percent
1946	Representative	1	8	12.50
1947	Senator	1	8	12.50
1949	Representative	1	100	1.00
1953	Representative	1	102	0.98
1955	Senator	1	8	12.50
1957	Representative	1	102	0.98
1961	Senator	1	8	12.50
	Representative	2	104	1.92
1963	Senator	1	8	12.50
1965	Senator	1	8	12.50
	Representative	6	104	5.77
1967	Senator	2	8	25.00
1969	Senator	0	8	0.00
	Representative	3	109	2.75
1971	Senator	1	8	12.50
1978	IBP Member	9	165	5.45
1984	M. Pambansa	10	181	5.52
1987	Senator	2	23	8.70
	Representative	19	202	9.41
1992	Senator	4	24	16.70
	Representative	19	200	9.50
Total		86	1,488	5.78

Source: Commission on Elections.

Appendix Table 5.1.2
ELECTED LOCAL OFFICIALS BY SEX, 1992 ELECTIONS

Position	Total	Male	Female	Percent Female*
Provinces				
Governor	76	64	7	9.21
Vice-governor	76	64	5	6.58
Sangg. panlalawigan	718	537	79	11.0
Cities				
Mayor	60	57	2	3.33
Vice-mayor	60	52	6	10.00
Sangg. panlungsod	675	498	68	10.07
Municipalities				
Mayor	1,543	1,336	121	7.84
Vice-mayor	1,543	1,315	133	8.62
Sangg. bayan	12,375	8,987	1,421	11.48

*Percent of women computed as the number of female divided by the total occupying the positions. This is based on partial data owing to incomplete reporting.
Source: Department of Interior and Local Government.

Affirmative action by the government has helped increase women's political participation in policy formulation, if not in electoral politics. The 1987 Constitution provided appointive seats for sectoral representations, with two seats reserved for women. Unfortunately, there has been no woman representative since 1989, and the seats remain unoccupied since the new Congress took over in July 1992.

At the local level, a similar seat for women in each legislature is provided for by the Local Government Code but no sectoral elections have been held and the seats remain unoccupied. Nevertheless, another indicator of political participation is the availability of sectoral representation for women in local legislative bodies and of sectoral seats for women in the national legislature. At the moment, no sectoral seats have been filled, except for the barangay chairmen and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, which fall under another category. No elections have been held for sectoral representatives. Nevertheless, women NGOs have actively

sought accreditation to field candidates for the sectoral elections. According to the National Council of Women of the Philippines (NCWP), 2,175 councils and affiliate organizations for women have sought accreditation. These cover 9,018,382 members. NCWP figures only account for 80 percent of the accredited organizations. Other groups are affiliated with G-10 (Group of Ten) and the Women's Advocacy Network for Development (WAND).

Lobbying is another aspect of policy formulation. This is one area where women in cause-oriented groups have been very active. There are more than 100 women-oriented NGOs in the Philippines concerned with specific policy issues. But a new group which emerged in 1992 — the Ugnayan ng mga Kababaihan sa Pulitika (UKP) — has been very active in different political activities. In the 1992 elections, it provided support only to candidates (male or female) who could be counted upon to work for its political agenda. UKP has also attempted to put more women in high administrative positions (Beltran 1993). It succeeded in getting President Ramos to appoint welfare officers for women overseas contract workers in labor offices abroad.

Another indicator is *advocacy of policies affecting women*. In the 1987-1991 Congress, more bills affecting the welfare of women were filed by men than by women (Reyes 1992). A possible implication is that women legislators have not been active advocates for their gender. On the other hand, this result is not surprising since women were and still are a small minority in the legislature. In the bureaucracy, Tapales (1984, 1985) found out that women's advocacy of policies correlated with the type of position they held rather than with their gender. Nonetheless, women's advocacy of policy issues may be used as indicators to measure their efforts in both lobbying and legislation.

Policy implementation

Women are most prominent in policy implementation. In 1980, 49.5 percent of members of the Philippine bureaucracy were female. Women comprised about 26 percent of the higher third level (career executive service) of the bureaucracy (Tapales 1984). By 1991, this share had risen to 28.8 percent (Sto. Tomas 1991). These figures, as seen in Appendix Table 5.1.3, are remarkable, even compared to those in the United States where the share of women in the senior executive service was 6.2 percent in 1980 and only 10 percent in 1990. Even more interesting is the larger share of women in the second level (professional/technical personnel). In 1980, they comprised 63 percent and in 1991, 59 percent (Tapales 1992b). This is because the Civil Service Commission classifies the teachers, the majority of whom are women, in the second level. But their lower proportion compared to the men in clerical and administrative positions (35 percent in 1980 and 41.95 percent in 1991) makes the Philippine experience unique since in most countries, women proliferate in lower level positions.

While most of the bureaucracy's task is implementation, persons in the upper echelons of the civil service also formulate policy. They decide on the details of implementation, issue implementing orders, and even initiate policy on certain aspects of their work. Thus, participation of women in policy implementation may be indicated by the number of women in policymaking positions in the bureaucracy.

Other indicators have also been used in the study of efficacy of women in the bureaucracy, including the (1) subjective *feeling of having influenced policy*, which was found higher among the majority of women civil servants in 1983 and 1989; and (2) *actual initiation of policy advocating the welfare of women*, which was found low in both years studied. (Tapales 1984, 1992b). Women tend to advocate issues affecting their own offices, without any gender bias.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Women NGOs participate in policy formulation mainly through lobbying. Their participation is most felt in the monitoring and evaluation of programs and projects. Their methods are lobbying, information dissemination

Appendix Table 5.1.3
PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN THE BUREAUCRACY,
BY LEVEL (1980 and 1991; in percent)

Position	1980	1991
First Level	35	42
Second Level	63	59
Third Level	26	29

Source: Civil Service Commission, 1991.

of complaints, and sometimes public approval. The UKP, GABRIELA, KABAPA, and many other women-oriented NGOs, perform this task most effectively. An indicator of this activity may, therefore, be the *number of active women-oriented NGOs*. There are, of course, a number of difficulties.

Using indicators that have been designated, one can conclude with Ward (1963) that even at this time, women in the Philippines have advantages over their sisters in other Third World countries. The high literacy rates and levels of education among Filpino women enable them to expand their choices in life. What hinders their fuller participation are the dictates of the Philippine socio- cultural milieu which place barriers to their entry into certain political activities. For instance, their *high voter turnout* does not square with their small participation in politics *vis-à-vis* that of men. Very few women run for public office to influence policy. Fewer women than men are active in political campaigns. Their seeming political passivity is traceable to their own perception, encouraged by society's norms, that politics is a man's domain.

However, Filipino women's participation in covert politics is again higher than in other countries, including even some economically affluent ones. More women in the Philippines occupy policy-determining positions in the bureaucracy. Women's organizations are among the most numerous and most active in the world. Many cause-oriented NGOs are headed by women-and are active advocates of policies affecting women. They have lobbied and caused the passage, amendment or abolition of such policies.

Filipinas are still constrained by the cultural script which assigns roles for them outside the political sphere. However, the women have shown that, despite those constraints, they certainly are not trapped into quiescence.

Appendix 5.2
PEOPLE'S AND NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

The following are the results of (1) survey of NGO leaders, and (2) case studies of two barangays. These were undertaken to test the instruments on peoples' participation. In constructing an index of people's participation in governance, a hierarchical factor model is available based on three main factors identified, namely: determinants of people's participation, modes of participation, and subjective political attitudes on participation. Gender and organizational affiliations are the determinants of people's participation; electoral activities, lobbying and mass actions are the modes available for participation; subjective political attitudes include, among others, the degree of satisfaction toward services provided by government.

The first instrument was constructed for measuring subjective political attitudes on people's participation and was tried on a total of 35 NGO leaders from 13 regions during a conference at the Philippine Center for Economic Development (PCED) Hostel in December 1992. This instrument was later refined and expanded and was administered in a household survey in two barangays in Bulacan — Barangay Pinalagdan in Paombong and Barangay Poblacion in Calumpit.

The province of Bulacan was selected as the site for the case study because it has the most number of successful NGOs/POs, totaling more than 700 to date. To draw comparisons between two barangays, they were chosen according to their varying distance from the political and economic center of the municipalities. Barangay Poblacion in Calumpit is easily accessible and is near the center, while Barangay Pinalagdan in Paombong is moderately far from the center.

▌ Subjective Political Attitudes on Participation: The Case of NGO/POs

A. Respondents' Profile
The NGOs/POs represented in the survey are classified according to their thrusts namely: social development (17), economic development (6), rural development (6), planning/coordination (4), labor-oriented (1), and research and training (1). The majority of respondents are male (60 percent).

Most belong to the age group 30-39 years old (45 percent) and 20- 29 years old (20 percent). A very high educational attainment is shown with 97 percent college graduates, among which, 28 percent have postgraduate degrees.

B. Perception of Government and Politics
Generally, respondents perceive that they have a say about what the government does. However, when it comes to decisionmaking, 57 percent perceive that the government, including public officials in general, does not pay much attention to what the people think. Specifically, the House of Representatives and the political parties are perceived to have not paid much attention to what the people think (66 percent and 54 percent, respectively). Moreover, political parties are interested in peoples' votes rather than in their opinions (91 percent). On the other hand, the Upper House received a more positive perception, 48 percent think that the senators pay some attention to those who have elected them in Congress. Also, local officials are perceived to have paid some attention to those who voted for them (66 percent).

Although more than half of the sample think that government and politics are so complicated to understand, 83 percent believe that voting is not the only way by which they can participate in government decision-making and that government does not pay much attention to elections anyway.

Regarding the kinds of people running the government, most of the respondents said that these people do not seem to know what they are doing (80 percent), or those who have big interests look out only for themselves (91 percent). They also believed that a lot of taxpayers' money are just being wasted for nothing (71 percent).

Respondents also distrust members of Congress and the office of the President (83 percent and 68 percent, respectively) in making decisions. Of all the specific government agencies listed, the most trusted is the Supreme Court, followed by the Senate. The least trusted are the military, House of Representatives, and the National Police. Furthermore, since there is not

much in the government to be proud of, it is believed that the form of government must undergo major changes to solve the country's problems (77 percent). Even as NGOs/POs have requested the government to listen and respond to their demands, no clear results are evident, according to 46 percent of the respondents.

C. Perception on NGOs Operating in their Respective Areas

Regarding their observations of NGOs operating in their areas, a fairly high percentage agrees that NGOs are allowed to observe in official meetings (60 percent) and have access to government records and documents (54 percent). Furthermore, report mechanisms are perceived to exist, particulary on findings and observations of NGOs, although NGO reports do not necessarily get a response from heads of agencies. Respondents also claim that the public are not informed about the actions undertaken on NGO reports (60 percent). As to whether cases are filed in the appropriate venues, a very low percentage (37 percent) believes that this is done. Nevertheless, they believe that there exist some mechanisms for the NGO's participation in minimizing or eliminating corruption.

D. Perception on the Quality of Government Services in the Local Areas

Quality of government services was determined in terms of accessibility, adequacy, affordability, and timeliness. The survey revealed that health services are available in the area, but the health center is far and cannot be reached by foot, according to 47 percent of the respondents. Nonetheless, they agreed that it is accessible by public transport (77 percent). Educational institutions are also available in the area. The high school can be reached by public transport but respondents disagree that elementary schools can be found in every barangay (51 percent). Although there are no problems on the accessibility of health, educational, and agricultural services and on the cost of transportation, respondents claim that transportation facilities are inadequate (57 percent) to link the barangays to the service providers, and the roads are not adequate to link the residents to the commuting service providers (54 percent).

On the affordability of services, respondents complain that there are no free consultations for health problems (60 percent) and no free medicines are readily available (83 percent). Neither can they afford the cost of consultation and medicines in government hospitals and even health centers (80 percent). Private hospitals do not offer alternative health service delivery since their prices are exhorbitant (71 percent).

On education, they agree that there is free elementary and high school education available to the average clientele (60 percent) but book rentals and other school expenses are expensive (57 percent).

They complain that health personnel (doctors and nurses) are unavailable when badly needed, especially in emergency situation (82 percent). Likewise, there are no packaged technology available to farmers and fishermen (68 percent).

In general, delivery of services is delayed (82 percent); health personnel are unable to solve the health problems of the residents (91 percent). Respondents are dissatisfied with the quality of education they receive (54 percent) and with the quality of government services in general (66 percent). They believe there are many ways by which their opinions can be expressed or heard, as follows:

    a) public forums, barangay assemblies, dialogues, seminars;

    b) resolutions, petitions;

    c) demonstrations;

    d) opinion/suggestion boxes;

    e) special bodies, i.e., barangay councils;

    f) media (radio, television, dailies);

    g) NGO presence in the area.

∎ People's Participation in Governance: The Case of Two Bulacan Barangays

A total of 100 household respondents were randomly interviewed, 50 samples from each barangay. The majority are female. NGO members and non-members were included in the survey.

A. The Bulacan Case: Area Profile

Provincial and Municipal Profile. Bulacan is located in the southeastern part of Central Luzon. It is bounded by the provinces of Aurora and Quezon on the east, Pampanga on the west, Nueva Ecija on the north, Metro

Manila on the south, Rizal on the southeast and Manila Bay on the southwest. It has 566 barangays and a total population of 1,505,219 (1992 data). The total number of households is 287,890. Bulacan is considered a first class province.

The municipality of Paombong is situated southwest of Malolos, the provincial capital, while Calumpit is situated northwest. Paombong has a population of 32,036 (1992) while Calumpit has 59,002. Both municipalities belong to the fourth class category.

Profiles of Barangay Pinalagdan and Poblacion.
Barangay Pinalagdan is about three kilometers from the town proper of Paombong. It has 309 households and a population of 1,774. The farm-to-market road is about three meters wide; half of its length is concrete while the other half is unpaved. Another road linking the eastern part of the barangay to the poblacion is under construction. A Rural Health Unit (RHU), a Day Care Center and an elementary school can be found in the barangay. For high school education, students go to Kapitangan, a neighboring barangay, or to the poblacion, which are accessible by foot or by public transport. A cooperative, the Pinalagdan Multi-Purpose

Appendix Table 5.2.1
PROFILE OF BARANGAYS
PINALAGDAN AND POBLACION

	Pinalagdan	Poblacion
Households	309	334
Population	1,774	1,819
Elementary school	1	1
High school	—	1
Rural Health Unit	1	1
Day Care Center	1	1
BDC	1	—
NGO	1	1
Accredited NGO	1	—
Distance from poblacion	3 km	n/a
Farm-to-market road	2	n/a
Artesian well	many	n/a

Cooperative, Inc. (PMPCI), was established about a year ago and has a current membership of around 60. PMPCI is represented in the Barangay Development Council (BDC).

Barangay Poblacion in Calumpit has a total population of 1,819 and a household population of 334. The barangay has both elementary and high schools and a community hospital. It has not yet created a Barangay Development Council. The Poblacion Farmers Credit Cooperative was created a few years ago. Information on both barangays are summarized in Appendix Table 5.2.1.

B. NGOs Operating in the Area and their Participation in the Political Process
About 15 accredited NGOs and 700 POs operate in Bulacan. All these NGOs are represented in the Provincial Development Council. Several of them are also represented in special provincial bodies such as the Provincial Health Board (BUKAS), Provincial School Board (Provincial Federation of Parent-Teacher Association), and Provincial Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (GABRIELA and Grassroots Philippines Service, Inc.). The Peace and Order Council and the Provincial Law Enforcement Board also have representatives from the NGO sector. In sectoral committees, such as infrastructure, social and economic development committees, NGO representatives act as chairmen of these committees. They help in the formulation of development plans.

In Paombong, 12 NGOs/POs are involved in development programs, particularly in the implementation of cooperative development, community organizing, and others. Six of these NGOs attend the Municipal Development Council meetings (Samahang Youth Club, Casak Brothers Civil Club Organization, 72 Discipolos ni Cristo, Sto. Niño Samahang Nayon, NORFIL Foundation, and Kapitangan Multi-Purpose Cooperative). However, the development programs that they support, such as infrastructure, are not considered as priority.

The municipality of Calumpit has a total of 29 accredited POs, of which 12 are represented in the MDC. Likewise, the NGOs have representatives in special boards such as the People's Law Enforcement Board, Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee, and Peace and Order Council. There is no NGO representative in the school board.

Appendix Table 5.2.2
P-VALUES OF THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTICS

Election Year	Voter Participation	Choice	Gender	NGO member ship	Gender/NGO member ship
1986	88%	1.00	.42	1.00	1.00
1987	88%	1.00	.42	1.00	1.00
1987	86%	1.00	.70	0.79	1.00
1988	88%	1.00	.42	1.00	1.00
1990	86%	1.00	.25	1.00	1.00
1992	91%	1.00	.34	0.99	1.00

C. Electoral Participation

Participation in the 1986 (presidential), 1987 (constitutional plebiscite), 1987 (congressional), 1988 (local), 1990 (barangay) and 1992 (national) electoral activities are analyzed by gender, by barangay, and by NGO membership using chi-square tests for contingency tables. The tests show that responses on electoral participation do not depend on these categories and, hence, uncorrelated. Therefore, it may be concluded that participation in all six elections does not depend on the gender, barangay, or organizational affiliation of the voter, and that there is no dependency between gender and NGO membership with respect to electoral participation.

D. Perception on Post-EDSA Elections

On the question of whether the post-EDSA elections were generally clean and honest or not, 69 percent said yes, 26 percent said no, and 5 percent had no opinion. The data show that at significance level alpha = 0.05, responses do not depend on barangays, membership in NGOs, or gender. Appendix Table 5.2.3 summarizes these results.

E. Mass Actions, Demonstrations and Lobbying

Participation in mass action, at alpha -.10, depends on the barangay and on NGO membership or non-membership, but not on gender. However, the tests are not significant at alpha -.05 for all categories. Of the respondents, 9 percent said they participate in demonstrations while 91 percent said they do not.

Appendix Table 5.2.3
PERCEPTION ON POST-EDSA ELECTIONS

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know (%)	p-value
Pinalagdan	72	28		
Poblacion	66	24	10	0.21
NGO members	73	27		
Non-NGO members	68	26	6	0.69
Male	62	31	7	
Female	65	22	3	0.50
Total	69	26	5	

Appendix Table 5.2.4
ATTENDANCE IN DEMONSTRATIONS

	Yes (%)	No (%)	p-value (corrected)
Pinalagdan		100	
Poblacion	17	83	.06
NGO members	27	73	
Non-NGO members	4	96	.06
Male	15	85	
Female	3	97	.24

On lobbying, more NGO members than non-members participate (p-value .001). However, at alpha level=0.10, there is no dependence on gender and on barangay. These conclusions are evident in Appendix Table 5.2.5.

F. Subjective Political Attitudes: Perception on Government Services

Results on perception about health, educational, social and agricultural services are described in this section. Availability of government services does not depend on barangays, as shown in the following tables of p-values, except in the case of doctors and nurses. The majority

Appendix Table 5.2.5
P-VALUES FOR LOBBYING

	Yes	No	p-value
Pinalagdan	38	62	
Poblacion	48	52	.60
NGO members	91	9	*
Non-NGO members	32	68	.001
Male	54	46	
Female	34	66	.22

aware of the calamities; of this, 94 percent reported that the government did some relief work. The agencies identified doing relief work were the local government (72 percent), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (5.5 percent), and others (3.5 percent); 19 percent reported they did not know. Awareness of the agencies doing relief work does not depend on barangays (p-value = 79). It is suggested that the instrument be tried in barangays where services are inadequate.

Conclusion

Generally, it can be said that NGO participation in development efforts has increased over the years. They are allowed participation in local development councils and special bodies and access to government records. They are able to express their views in these councils. However, it does not follow that their views are always heard by government.

On the quality of government services, NGOs agree that there are available facilities, particularly health and educational services, in their areas. Physical accessibility to these facilities is not a problem. However, public transport is inadequate to bring clientele to where the services are located. Also, health personnel are not always available, especially when they are most needed. There is not much question on the availability of medical supplies and educational materials, but their high cost is bugging the ordinary clientele. Services may be available, but the quality of these services does not meet the needs of the clientele.

The result of the Bulacan survey is not surprising since basic government services, including health service facilities and medicines, are generally available in the barangays. However, the doctors and nurses are not there all the time. Barangay Pinalagdan, although mod-

Appendix Table 5.2.6
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES

	Combined		Pinalagdan		Poblacion		P-value
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	
Barangay Health Unit	96	4	93	7	100	—	NS
Free medicines	94	6	90	10	97	3	NS
Affordability of medicines	71	29	62	38	79	21	.27
Availability of doctor	33	67	21	79	45	55	.09
nurse	30	70	14	86	45	55	.02
midwife	95	5	97	3	93	7	1.00
dentist	28	72	17	83	38	62	.14
teacher	97	3	97	3	97	3	NS
social worker	79	21	72	28	86	14	.33
environmental officer	14	86	10	90	17	83	.24
Satisfaction on health services	71	29	62	38	79	21	.27

high cost is bugging the ordinary clientele. Services may be available, but the quality of these services does not meet the needs of the clientele.

The result of the Bulacan survey is not surprising since basic government services, including health service facilities and medicines, are generally available in the barangays. However, the doctors and nurses are not there all the time. Barangay Pinalagdan, although moderately distant from the poblacion of Paombong,. is accessible by foot and by public transport and is provided with basic services like electricity, water, educational institutions, and irrigation. Because of the presence of the NORFIL Foundation in the area, the barangay was for a time a beneficiary of financial assistance in the form of livelihood projects. It helped organized the Pinalagdan Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

Moreover, the survey also reveals that NGO membership plays a significant role in political participation, such as lobbying and mass demonstrations. People's participation in political process does not depend on gender and location of the barangay.

Being a host to the phenomenal growth of cooperatives, from 52 in 1986 to 727 in 1992 with assets worth P24.19 million in 1983 to P955 million in 1992, Bulacan is not heavily dependent on government basic services because the people can depend on alternative basic services delivery systems. This overall situation can help in understanding the results of the survey.